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Abstract
We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source
of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election.
We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there
is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the
weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by
implementing a “centrist” policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility
of the threat, “posturing” by the strong party leads to platform divergence.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines how voting and the outcomes of majority rule elections are
a¤ected by factors beyond the control of the winning party. We present a model
that helps to predict how threats against the electoral process in‡uence: (1) platform
choice by political parties, (2) which party wins the election, and (3) the policy
outcomes …nally implemented. In a democracy where the majority winner sets policy,
dissatis…ed groups, including groups outside the electoral process, may still be able
to interfere with that policy. A losing party may organize a coup; voters may riot;
unions may go on strike; investors may take their capital abroad; terrorists and foreign
powers may threaten disruption and loss of life; foreign powers may withdraw aid or
even impose a trade embargo. We analyze the e¤ect of these non-electoral factors on
electoral outcomes.
We consider a majority-rule electoral competition between two political parties
with ideal policies lying to either side of the median voter’s ideal policy. We allow
for only a one-dimensional policy space but the disruption possibility leads to a two-
dimensional outcome space.
As evident in the examples given above, the actors threatening to interfere with the
winner’s policy can be inside or outside the electoral process. We focus on the case
where there is only one such actor and where the policy preference of the threatening
actor is aligned with one of the political parties. That party’s policy proposal faces
no threat of disruption and is called the “strong” party. The other party will be
called the “weak” party. We will say that the “strong” party is “directly strong” if
it controls the unrest itself (e.g., when the threatening actor and the strong party
are one and the same and “inside” the political process.) It is “indirectly strong” if
the threatening actor is a distinct agent, an “outsider” to the political process.1 The
distinction between direct and outsider control is important only in sections V and
1In this “outsider control” case, the “strength” derives from the fact that the threatening actor
has the same ideal point and its threats “support” the strong party’s interests.
2VI where we allow parties to commit to a platform.2
“Outsider control” is the most common case. Examples include terrorist activities
by private militias, labor strikes by unions and capital ‡ight by investors responding
to high taxes or restrictive regulations. Direct control is applicable when one political
party controls the military or has a private militia. For instance, in the 1970 and
1980 elections in Zimbabwe, voters and political parties knew that Robert Mugabe
controlled the military and could organize a coup if he lost an election. Under both
direct control and outsider control, the threatening actor accepts the winner’s policy
if it is close enough to its own preferred policy, but otherwise rejects the policy by
initiating political unrest or causing disruption.
Our …rst result is surprising: when parties cannot commit to the policy they will
implement upon winning, the “weak party” may bene…t from its own weakness.
When the weak party wins, it will always choose policy that is a compromise with
the threatening actor (be it a party or an outsider). A winning strong party will
always choose to implement its ideal policy: this incurs no risk of interference even
under outsider control. However, when the weak party does not know how much
compromise is necessary, voters may not trust the weak party to limit the risk of
disruption.
Our second result demonstrates how uncertainty captures distrust: whenthe threat-
ening party’s propensity to interfere is privately known by the strong party, voters
may support an extremist “strong party” to avoid the risk of disruption. This is illus-
trated by El Salvador’s …rst post civil war election (see Section VII and Wantchekon
[1999]).
When political parties can commit to their platforms prior to elections, we ask
whether the platforms will converge, and which party will win the election. We …nd
that parties converge to the median voter’s ideal point when the threat is minor.
2Note that there are two reasons why a party might cause disruption: to obtain direct bene…ts of
o¢ce and to shift the policy outcome. In the outsider control case, only the policy shifting reason is
valid but our analysis applies equally given the assumption we make.
3When the threat is serious, they converge at the strong party’s reservation policy,
that is, the policy outcome at which the strong party is indi¤erent between disrupting
the political process and accepting the winner’s policy proposal. Furthermore, in the
case of direct control with a direct bene…t to winning the election, our model predicts
that the strong party wins if the threat is serious. This is so because the strong party
can o¤er a policy that is a little closer to the median voter’s ideal point than the weak
party can o¤er while credibly avoiding the risk of political unrest. The strong party
would lose the direct bene…ts from winning if it creates unrest to undo its own policy.
Thus, the strong party can credibly promise a more centrist undisrupted policy than
can the weak party.
Our model also allows us to predict when platforms will diverge in an election.
When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the interference threat, “posturing”
by a strong party with private information about the risk of unrest can lead to
platform divergence. Such platform divergence occurs because the strong party knows
that voters are willing to trade o¤ policy preference against political unrest.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the basic model, which in-
volves two competing parties that di¤er in their ability to interfere in the political
process. Section III analyzes the equilibrium behavior of the basic model, assuming
that the two parties’ costs of political unrest are exogenous and known by everyone.
Section IV shows the equilibrium outcome when parties’ costs of disrupting the po-
litical process are private information. Sections V and VI extend the basic model to
the case where parties can choose policy platforms before the election. With known
party costs of disruption, platforms tend to converge. However, reintroducing private
information in Section VI, we can explain divergent platforms even when the direct
bene…ts from winning the election are arbitrarily large. Section VII discusses four
applications of the model. Section VIII concludes, and all proofs are in the Appendix.
4II. THE MODEL
We consider an electoral game involving two political parties and a large number of
voters. One set of actors can induce political unrest as a response to electoral defeat.
The threat of unrest or “interference” may be controlled by a political party or by an
outsider. The game has four stages. First, parties choose platforms. Then, there is
an election. After the election, the winner sets a policy. Finally, the losing party or
the outsider either accepts that policy or responds with disruptive interference. We
will …rst study the case where parties cannot commit to their platforms (in which
case the …rst stage of the game is irrelevant), and then we will move to the case where
they can commit to their platforms.
Preferences. We assume that voters are risk neutral and have single peaked
political preferences represented by an ideal point, µ 2 [¡2;2], with constant marginal
disutility for deviation from this ideal point. We assume that the median voter
denoted M has an ideal point at µ = 0. Furthermore, a voter of type µ has a …xed
negative payo¤, ¡cµ, whenever political unrest takes place.
Under direct control, one of the two parties, s, is strong and earns ¡cs if it initiates
political unrest. The other party, w, is weak and gains a lower payo¤ ¡cw if political
unrest occurs (¡cw < ¡cs).3 When unrest is controlled from outside the electoral
system, the outsider, denoted z; gets a payo¤ ¡cz by initiating unrest. The weak
party and the strong party then get lower payo¤s, ¡cw and ¡cs, respectively.
Like voters, parties have single peaked policy preferences. The weak party has its
ideal point at +2, while the strong party and the threatening outsider have their
ideal points at ¡2:4 We denote by i, the identity of the winning party and by y its
policy proposal. We denote by r the probability of interference by the losing party
3In the case of a military coup by the strong party, one could argue that ¡cs would be positive
because this party takes power and gets the direct bene…ts of o¢ce. However we will assume that
“interference” generally involves some costs for all parties.
4This assumes that no voter is more extreme than either party, but this simpli…cation can easily
be removed.
5or the outsider. Thus, the outcome of the election can be characterized by the triple:
(y;r;i).
Payo¤s. Players’ utility functions depend on (1) the distance between their ideal
points and the policy outcomes, (2) the cost of political unrest and (3) the probability
of political unrest. The payo¤ for a voter with ideal point µ , Uµ (y;r;i) is given by
¡[(1 ¡r) ¢ jy ¡ µj +r ¢ cµ]:
Political parties have preferences of the same form but they may also value winning
per se. That is, we allow for the addition of a bene…t, R, to the winning party’s payo¤,
conditional on the winner not facing interference.5 But this direct bene…t is irrelevant
when parties cannot commit to a platform, so we set R = 0 without loss of generality
until Section V. Noting that jy ¡ (¡2)j = 2 + y and jy ¡ 2j = 2 ¡ y,6 the strong
party’s payo¤, Us (y;r;i), is given by
¡[(1 ¡r) ¢(y +2 ¡ R ¢Is) +r ¢ cs]
where Is = 1 if s wins the election and Is = 0 if it loses. Meanwhile, the weak party’s
payo¤, Uw (y;r;i), is
¡[(1 ¡r) ¢(2 ¡y ¡ R ¢Iw)+ r ¢ cw]:
Again, Iw = 1 if w wins and Iw = 0 otherwise. For z, the payo¤, Uz (y;r;i) is
¡[(1 ¡r) ¢(y +2) +r ¢ cz].
Note that if there is no unrest, each party is guaranteed a payo¤ of at least ¡4; and
the median voter is guaranteed a payo¤ of at least ¡2: in the extreme case when one
party wins the election and implements its ideal point, its payo¤ is R, its opponent’s
¡4; and the median voter’s ¡2:
5To simplify, we assume that payo¤s from interference do not depend on which party won.
6Note that jy ¡ (¡2)j = 2+y and jy ¡ 2j = 2¡y hold for y 2 [¡2;2]. y 2 [¡2;2] can be justi…ed
by using the fact that neither party uses dominated strategies.
6We assume that (1) political unrest is more costly to the weak party than to
the threatening actor, (2) interference by the threatening actor imposes such large
costs on all other parties that they prefer any policy to one which always leads to
interference. This assumption simpli…es the analysis and is appropriate to major
threats such as coups and widespread strikes, terrorist activity and capital ‡ight,7
and (3) the threatening actor has costs su¢ciently low that it interferes with the
electoral outcome if the weak party does not compromise towards ¡2; That is,
ASSUMPTION A1: cw > 4, cs 2 (0;4)
ASSUMPTION A1
0
: cw;cs > 4, cz 2 (0;4)
The …rst part of each assumption captures the fact that the weak and the indirectly
strong parties have a vested interest in maintaining peace and in avoiding disruption.
The second part captures s or z’s incentive to interfere after the election. We further
assume that the cost of violence on voters is independent of their ideal points and
that political unrest imposes such a large cost on voters that they prefer any policy
to one that always leads to political unrest. That is,
ASSUMPTION A2: 8µ, cµ = c ¸ 4:
The median voter M is said to be decisive if and only if the strong party s (re-
spectively the weak party w) wins whenever M strictly prefers s (respectively w).
Assumption A2 enables us to derive conditions under which the median voter is de-
cisive. We solve for the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium extending the solution concept
to Perfect Bayesian Equilibria when private information is present. We rule out
non-credible threats by adding the mild assumption that no player follows a weakly
dominated strategy. In particular,
ASSUMPTION AA: s, w and z never adopt a weakly dominated strategy.
7A small subset of voters who are not so hurt by the interference is plausible but should not undo
our results.
7This allows us to use A1 and A2 to prove our key lemma showing that the median
voter is decisive in the case of direct control, even though the post-electoral outcome
has two dimensions, y and r. For the case of outsider control (A1 replacing A1
0
),
we need to be sure that s can always predict what z will do. We therefore assume
throughout that s knows cz and to avoid having z follow a mixed strategy which s
cannot predict, we assume that z is peaceful when indi¤erent:
ASSUMPTION AB: s observes cz and z never creates unrest when indi¤erent.
The lemma is stated below. In order to prove the decisiveness of the median voter
(part ii), we will use the fact that voters anticipate that political unrest never occurs
when s wins the election (part i).
LEMMA 1: Under both direct (A1, A2 and AA) and outsider (A1
0
, A2, AA, and
AB) control, (i) r = 0 at any policy potentially set by s; (ii) the median voter
is decisive.
The proof of Lemma 1 uses the fact that the utility functions and the costs of
political unrest to the players are separable. In Ellman and Wantchekon (1999) we
prove the Lemma under less restrictive assumptions on the cost of unrest, cµ.
In the next two sections, we solve for equilibrium when neither party can commit
to a platform.
III. NO PLATFORM COMMITMENT AND NO PRIVATE
INFORMATION
We …rst describe the outsider control case and brie‡y explain the direct control
case. Suppose that y is the policy chosen at stage 3 by the majority winner. At stage
4, the outsider, z, initiates political unrest if ¡cz > ¡2¡ y. We de…ne y ´ cz ¡2 so
that the two payo¤s are equated at y = y. Given Assumption AB, z’s best response
is to initiate political unrest if y > y and not to initiate political unrest if y · y.8
8Note that there is only one threatening actor: neither w nor s “interferes” by assumption A1
0
.
8When w wins and chooses y at stage 3, w anticipates a payo¤ of ¡cw from setting
y > y and y ¡ 2 from setting y · y. It is optimal for w to avoid unrest with the
least possible policy compromise by setting y = y: Using ¤ to identify w’s equilibrium
strategies, we have y¤
w = y. In contrast, when s wins and chooses the policy, s can
choose its ideal point. Since s and z have the same ideal point, z will not cause unrest
against this policy. Thus, the policy outcome is ys = ¡2 if s wins and yw = y if w
wins. At stage 2, voters anticipate these electoral outcomes. By A1
0
, y is closer to
the median voter’s ideal point than ¡2, so the median voter prefers w to win. So, by
Lemma 1, w wins. The policy implemented is y and the probability of unrest, r = 0.
Note that there is no risk of unrest because w dislikes unrest and is perfectly aware
how much compromise is required.
The result is equally true under A1 (the direct control case). We only need to note
that s still sets ys = ¡2 at stage 3 because this guarantees it its highest possible
payo¤. The outcome is exactly as above, except that ¹ y = cs¡2. We will refer to y as
the reservation policy of the threatening actor. It is the minimal policy compromise
which w (or w and s) must make to prevent s (or z) from causing trouble.
PROPOSITION 1. Under A1 (respectively A1
0
), there is a unique Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium: the weak party wins the election, implements the strong party’s
(respectively, threatening actor’s) reservation policy, and there is no political
unrest, i.e., i = w; y¤
w = y ´ cs ¡2 (respectively cz ¡ 2) and r = 0:
Proposition 1 shows that the threat of collapse in the political process can prevent
the winner from “taking all” even in a majoritarian system. Under complete infor-
mation, the median voter prefers the weak party because she anticipates that the
weak party will be moderated toward her ideal point by the fear of political unrest.9
9This is an example of (ex post) moderation of policy outcomes. The moderation is independent
of voter behavior in contrast to Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) in which moderation arises because
voters select a president and then select an opposing group of legislators. We also note that our result
will apply even for a multi-party election so long as that the threat of unrest forces the winning party
to moderate its policy proposal.
9The median voter is decisive in the one-dimensional context where political unrest
never occurs because preferences are single peaked and identical up to translations
of the ideal point. If the strong party or threatening outsider could credibly commit
against creating unrest after the election, the median voter would anticipate that, if
elected, the weak party would implement its ideal policy. In this case, the median
voter would vote for the strong party. Thus, the strong party’s electoral loss comes
from its inability to commit not to interfere after the election.
Robustness: We note two possibilities which reverse this surprising result. Were
cs < 0, w would be unable to compromise enough to avoid political unrest and voters
would vote for s instead of w. Secondly, as mentioned above, one might want to
consider the case in which the order of stages 3 and 4 is reversed (for example, if policy
choice becomes …xed only some time after the election and the electoral winner can
neutralize the threat of s or z in this interim since the interference decision must be
made before the policy choice is observed)10. Unrest must pre-empt “disarmament.”
Now that the electoral winner sets the policy after the unrest decision has been made,
w will set y = 2 at stage 4. Anticipating this, s (or z) would create unrest as soon
as w wins (before being “disarmed”). Voters then prefer to vote for s rather than
w because y = 2 is better than r = 1. In this case, w su¤ers from being unable to
commit to a policy and w would bene…t when platform commitment becomes possible
at stage 1.11 We focus on the timing stated in section II because a party’s policy
plan often becomes clear before the party is able to neutralize interference threats.
However, the alternative timing is an interesting avenue for further research.
Proposition 1 can help make sense of electoral outcomes in new democracies where
the most “peaceful” party or the party with the weakest military support has been
elected. For instance, in Chile in 1990, Patricio Alwin’s Center-Left coalition won
against Hernán Büchi’s strong right-wing party which had close ties to the armed
10Sometimes militias can be disarmed and new legislation can constrain unions or prevent capital
‡ight.
11Thanks to Oliver Hart for suggesting further investigation of this commitment issue.
10forces. Upon winning, Alwin implemented relatively conservative economic policies
and continued the market reforms started under General Pinochet. We suggest that
sixteen years of Pinochet made his party’s reservation policy relatively predictable
and that this policy compromise was necessary to prevent a military coup.12 For this
reason voters could trust Alwin’s party to compromise enough to avoid a coup. As
we show in the next section, when the reservation policy is private information, the
weak party may lose because voters know that it would risk causing unrest.
IV. NO PLATFORM COMMITMENT AND THE STRONG PARTY
HAS PRIVATE INFORMATION.
Inthis section, we allow the strong party to have private information over the ability
of the threatening actor to disrupt the political process. We show that the strong
party may win because of people’s fear of such disruption. For the direct control
case, it is assumed that the strong party alone knows the true value of cs and hence
its reservation policy, ¹ y. This assumption makes good sense when cs is reinterpreted
as the strong party’s subjective expectation (at stage 4) of its cost from interference.
The strong party chooses whether or not to initiate political unrest based on this
subjective expectation.
For the case of outsider control, we have to assume that the outsider shares its
information with the strong party, that is to say, only s and z know the true value of
cz and hence y. There is no di¤erence between the results under direct control and
outsider control so we simply describe the case of direct control. In order to simplify








with Prob. 1 ¡ p
12More recently (November 1998), the Chilean government, particularly its socialist foreign min-
ister, strongly supported Pinochet in his attempt to avoid extradition from England to Spain where
he would face charges of human rights violations during his presidency.
11where fa;bg 2 [¡2;2] . Thus, y = a, with probability p, and that y = b, with
probability 1¡ p.13 In order to focus our analysis on the case where all types of the
strong party have reservation policies relatively close to their ideal point of ¡2, we
assume that the “softer” type of the strong party has its reservation policy, b, located
to the left of the median voter. That is,
ASSUMPTION 3: ¡2 · a < b < 0:
The probability of political unrest if w is elected is now given by,
r(yw) =
8
> > > > <




if yw 2 [¡2;b]
if yw 2 [a;b]
if yw 2 [b;2]:
De…ne Y ¤
w ´ argmaxyf¡j2 ¡ yj(1 ¡ r(y)) ¡ cw ¢ r(y)g and y¤
w 2 Y ¤
w. We claim that
Y ¤
w = fa;bg: To prove this claim, note that any policy y 2 (b;2] leads to a payo¤ of
¡cw and is strictly dominated by y = a. This is due to the fact that y = a gives a
payo¤ of at least ¡4 ¸ ¡cw. Similarly, y 2 (a;b) is strictly dominated by y = b and
y 2 [¡2;a) is strictly dominated by y = a.
Let r¤ = r(y¤
w) and re denote the equilibrium probability of political unrest. We
show that when w wins the election, re = r¤. When w wins, w trade-o¤ policy against
risk of political unrest. We de…ne by b cw the cost of unrest at which w is indi¤erent
between choosing a “safe” policy, y = a and a “risky” policy y = b. Proposition
2 presents a su¢cient condition for the occurrence of political unrest in equilibrium
and proposition 3 describes the electoral outcomes. Proposition 2 has two parts: 2(i)
points out that if w wins, the risk of unrest is a decreasing step function of cw. 2(ii)
points out that even if w risks to cause political unrest, the equilibrium risk of unres
is wh n c0 is su¢ciently large. This is because voters will then vote for s which
always sets y = ¡2 so that r = 0. We de…ne by ^ c0 the cost of unrest at which the
median voter would switch from voting for w (at y = b and r = p) to voting for s.
13For an analysis of the continuous types case, see Ellman and Wantchekon [1999].
12DEFINITION 2: ^ c0 ´
2 +b(1 ¡p)
p
and ^ cw ´
(2 ¡a) +(b ¡2)(1 ¡p)
p
:
PROPOSITION 2: (i) When the weak party wins, the probability of political unrest,
r¤ = p if cw · ^ cw and r¤ = 0 as cw ¸ ^ cw. (ii) Furthermore, re = r¤ for c0 < b c0
and re = 0 for c0 > b c0.
When the cost of political unrest for the weak party is su¢ciently large, that is
if cw ¸ ^ cw, then the weak party will win the election by credibly promising to set
yw = a; leading to r¤ = 0 (and re = r¤ = 0). When cw < ^ cw, the weak party will set
yw > a: This leads to a positive probability of interference when the weak party wins,
r¤ > 0. As a result, if cw < ^ cw, and c0 < ^ c0, then the weak party wins. Otherwise,
the strong party wins. When c0 = ^ c0 each party wins with probability 1
2. For the
sake of emphasis, we state the corollary as a proposition:
PROPOSITION 3: The strong party wins when both cw < ^ cw and c0 > ^ c0.
The result shows that if cw is su¢ciently large, the weak party never risks causing
political unrest and will always win exactly as in the Proposition 1. If c0 is small,
the median voter is not overly concerned by political unrest. As a result, the median
voter will vote for the weak party, even though this choice can lead to political unrest.
So for the strong party to win, c0 must be large relative to cw.
The strong party has an incentive to scare voters (make them feel that c0 is large)
but also to obfuscate its willingness to create unrest. The uncertainty surrounding
its own (or the threatening actor’s) militancy creates an atmosphere of insecurity if
cw is su¢ciently small that voters believe w will then be willing to risk unrest. This
compels voters to lean toward the strong party if they believe that c0 ¸ ^ c0.
Figure I presents the equilibrium probability of unrest r¤ as a function of cw.
Insert Figure I here
Proposition 3 re‡ects on electoral behavior in the …rst democratic elections of a
country trying to move forward after a period of civil war. For instance, in Liberia
13in 1997, restoration of civil order was the main motive behind the massive vote for
the former warlord, Charles Taylor. The same can be said about ARENA’s victory
in the 1994 presidential elections in El Salvador (see Section VII). Even in Western
democracies faced with serious outside challenges (such as France in 1958) or the
threat of internal collapse (Weimar in the 1930s), concerns about the survival of the
democratic process may lead the electorate to prefer politicians who have strong ties
to the armed forces and can enforce some form of civil order. The rise of fascism
or military-style government in some Western democracies before and immediately
after the Second World War can be seen as cases where c0 > ^ c0 led to the electoral
victory of a strong party.
V. PLATFORM COMMITMENT AND NO PRIVATE
INFORMATION
In Sections III and IV above, parties were unable to commit to a policy platform.
Voting was determined by the parties’ ideal points, and the distribution of the threat-
ening actor’s reservation policy. Here and in the next section, we assume that while
parties cannot commit against initiating political unrest, they can commit to a policy
platform. Platform commitment in this case means the winning party will implement
the policy proposed in its campaign platform, as long as there is no political unrest.
This assumption is more plausible for stable countries such as the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Norway and Chile since the 1980s.
In order to motivate platform commitment, we argue that in stable democracies, re-
peated elections allow parties to try to build a reputation for honoring their campaign
promises (see Alesina [1988]). For the case of directly controlled threats, we further
argue that it is harder to build a reputation for creating unrest.14 Alternatively,
we can assume that, while choice of party leader provides a credible commitment to
14The winner of an election in a stable democracy might be better controlled than the loser. For
instance, an executive who violates the constitution can be impeached, while an opposition leader
who breaks the law might have less to lose.
14the policy platform represented by the leader’s speci…c ideology, either someone else
controls the disruption decision or the leader’s speci…c willingness to disrupt is not
observable to the voters and the weak party.
We de…ne by xs and xw, the strong party and the weak party’s platforms. There
are two stages of backward induction left to be solved. Even after parties choose
their platforms, voters have to anticipate how the strong party would respond if
the weak party won the election. Additionally, the parties choose their platforms
in anticipation of the electoral and political outcomes that will follow. Now that
policy commitment is possible before the election, the direct bene…t from winning
the election, R, cannot be “normalized” to 0. We denote the probability that s wins
by ¼(xs;xw) ´ Pr(i = sjxs;xw):
For simplicity, we focus on the outsider control case (assumption A1
0
) and brie‡y
describe the insider control case afterwards.15 Since there is no private information
in this section, the reservation policy of the outsider, y ´ cz ¡ 2 is known by all the
players. We …nd that the equilibrium platforms converge at min(0;y).16
PROPOSITION 4: Under outsider control of political unrest with no private infor-
mation, party platforms converge at min(0; ¹ y): There is no political unrest, and
either party may win the election.
Proposition 4 shows that in an environment where parties can commit to their
platforms, we should observe more platform convergence. The result is driven by
the fact that both parties can now credibly make enough policy compromise in order
to win the election, in contrast to the no-commitment case (section III) where only
the weak party can make any credible policy compromise. Under direct control of
political unrest, platform convergence still occurs at min(0; ¹ y) only now, for the case
where ¹ y < 0, the strong party always wins in equilibrium. This is because the strong
15As mentioned before, we assume that z, the outsider, has an ideal point of ¡2, but a less extreme
outsider would give similar results.
16This is a version of the well known median voter theorem. As Shepsle [1991] shows, the theorem
does not hold if the election involves more than two parties.
15party can deviate to ¹ y+" for " < R and pick up votes whereas the weak party cannot
win with such a deviation because voters know that s would initiate political unrest
against y = xw = ¹ y + ".17
Our results help explain platform choices in the 1990 Chilean elections mentioned
above, in which the two candidates adopted essentially the same platform on the
main policy issues, especially tax reform. The same logic applies to the 1992 and
1995 elections in Sweden, where increased capital mobility owing to liberalization and
integration of international capital markets led social democrats and conservatives to
converge toward …scal discipline and less generous welfare and wage policies (see
Moses (1994) for a description of this “ideological abdication” of the Swedish social
democrats). As the next section shows, when voters are ignorant of the risks of capital
‡ight or other forms of disruption, such “ideological abdication” becomes less likely
and platform divergence will occur.
VI. PLATFORM COMMITMENT WHEN THE STRONG PARTY
HAS PRIVATE INFORMATION
In this section we show that the strong and weak parties may choose divergent pol-
icy positions. This is in contrast to the well-known result that platform commitment
leads to convergence. Roemer [1994] and Calvert [1985] have shown that incomplete
information over voter preferences can explain some polarization. However, they
point out that convergence of equilibrium platforms is a relatively robust result when
parties value winning per se (R > 0), and uncertainty about the median voter’s lo-
cation is not great. In the case of outsider control, we derive a strong polarization
result which holds even when the bene…t from winning is arbitrarily large and voter
preferences are known. While other explanations of polarization are compelling in
other situations, our novel result has a useful predictive power whenever key factors
threatening some form of unrest can be discerned. For the sake of clarity, we continue
to focus on the more plausible case of outsider control. We explain how our results
17The proof of this result is available upon request.
16change for the “insider” control case at the end.
Parties can commit to their platforms as in the previous section but now the level of
intransigence of the outsider is imperfectly observed by the weak party and the voters.
We show that polarization arises on account of posturing by the (indirectly) strong
party. Even when the outsider is relatively weak, the strong party can pretend to
know that the outsider is militant in the hope that voters will be fooled. The strong
party signals this claim of militancy by adopting an extremist platform (it is less
willing to converge when the outsider threat really is militant). When the voters are
swayed by this posturing, they accept the strong party’s extreme platform. The weak
party will not converge to that platform because it thinks that voters may be less
afraid of the strong party than the strong party had hoped. The weak party then
gains from having o¤ered a platform closer to its own ideal point.
As section III, we model the uncertainty over the threatening actor’s intransigence
by allowing cz and therefore the outsider’s reservation policy to be private informa-
tion. We assume that z can be one of two types: z1 is militant and has y = a; z2
is weaker and has y = b. Only s (and z) are assumed to learn the actual realization
of cz before the election is held. Since we are in the outsider control case, we have
assumption A1
0
with stochastic cz. Note that while cs is …xed for this case, we write
s = s1 when s learns that z is “militant” (has low cost cz = a +2) and s = s2 when
z is “soft.”
If voters are su¢ciently afraid of a militant threat (p is high and or c0 is high), s1
and s2 might pool on x · a and always win so that w might as well converge. The
following assumption helps to rule out the pooling equilibria which allow convergence
through voters’ fear,




If the weak party is too averse to unrest (high cw), it may avoid all risk of unrest
by o¤ering only the highest no risk platform, x = a. Assumption A5 is used to ensure
that the weak party is willing to risk political unrest by not converging to the militant
17outsider’s reservation policy, a, in the hope that z is only type z2. Note that this
assumption gets monotonically weaker as R increases and is reasonable even for R
close to 0.






We can now prove that platforms must diverge and that this divergence prediction
is robust to an arbitrarily large direct bene…t of winning. Formally, we have:
PROPOSITION 5: Under outsider control of political unrest, all PBE (in undom-






of the time. In particular, this divergence is
robust to arbitrarily large R.
The proof (see Appendix) shows that, given our assumptions, s always takes an
extremist position when s knows that z is militant (a policy to the right of a would
lead to unrest with probability 1). Furthermore, in equilibrium, w (and perhaps s
when aware that z is relatively soft) will move to platform b with probability bounded
away from 0. This is explained in the proof of Propostion 5 (see Appendix).
The equilibrium in which s1 and s2 pool at a while w o¤ers b and always wins
is one of many which cannot arise in the case of direct control. This is so because
s2 wants to win and can achieve this goal by o¤ering b + " when s controls unrest
directly. In the case of direct control, the equilibria can be pinned down more tightly.
Unfortunately, when R ! 1, we cannot rule out divergence so easily as explained
below.
The case of direct control: Platform divergence can also occur when the strong
party directly controls political unrest. For instance, for arbitrarily large R, there
exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the stronger type of the strong party
chooses xs1 = a, the weaker type of strong party randomizes between xs2 = a and
xs2 = b; and the weak party chooses xw = b. In this equilibrium, the weak party
18sometimes wins when the platforms diverge but always loses when the platforms
converge at b:
However, we can no longer rule out the existence of convergent equilibria as R ! 1.
The problem is that s1 can now o¤er x to the right of a because s1 will not revolt
against itself for any x < a+R even though it revolts against w for any x > a.18 As
R ! 1, a + R ! 1 too, so this upper bound on s1’s platform becomes too high to
guarantee divergence. Even without this, divergence can arise as a result of private
information about the strength of a threat. We now use the model to help understand
platform divergence under the threat of disruption without worrying exactly how
much control the strong party has over that threat.
Before we turn to some applications of the model, we present a summary table of
the equilibrium policies and outcomes discussed in Sections III-VI.
Insert Table I here
VII. APPLICATIONS
A. Platform Divergence:
Great Britain, 1974. A central question in the February 1974 elections in Great
Britain was: “who could control the unions?” The Labour party presented itself
as the party most capable of negotiating an end to serious labor disruption. On the
other hand, the Conservative Party and the incumbent prime minister Edward Heath
wanted a mandate to …ght in‡ation and union militancy by limiting wage increases
(Butler and Kavanagh [1974], p. 265). According to Butler and Kavanagh [1974], the
electorate was ambivalent about the unions. The median voter appeared to favor the
Conservative Party which could “stand up to the unions which push for large wage
claims”, yet the median voter did not want “the inconvenience which would attend
dispute” (p. 256). In the election, the Labour Party narrowly won by promoting a
pact with the unions.
18This is because when s wins, it stands to lose the political bene…t R which is contingent on
winning power without resorting to extra-political means.
19The evidence compiled by Dorfman [1978] and Butler et al. [1974] suggests that
public ambivalence regarding the unions resulted in a platform divergence between
the two parties on the election’s main issue: how to …ght in‡ation. While the Conser-
vatives stressed the need to control wages, Labour pressed for price controls and limits
on pro…ts (Butler et al., p. 55). Our model19 provides the rationale for this platform
divergence between the two parties. Because Labour thought that voters were fearful
enough of disruptive strikes, it had no incentive to adopt a moderate position. In
contrast, the Conservatives hoped that voters would doubt the threat of strikes, and
showed no leniency towards the unions by con…rming their uncompromising position
on controlling wage increases (Butler et al., p. 98).
Taiwan, 1996. The 1996 presidential election in Taiwan took place, not under
the pressure of domestic violence, but under the pressure of an external power. The
main candidates were Lee Teng-hui from the Kuo Min Tan (KMT), Peng Ming-min
from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Lin Yang-kang from the New
Party (NP). Prior to the election, China staged a nine-month military campaign
with the clear intent of threatening and intimidating Taiwan’s electorate and to stop
its move towards independence. However, while the New Party maintained its anti-
independence platform, the KMT and the DPP grew more de…ant of China in light of
the threats20. Both the KMT and the DPP shifted their campaign platforms in favor
of more pro-independence policies. Proposition 5 suggests that such platform polar-
ization is the result of voters’ uncertainty about the real intentions of the “outsider,”
19We use the outsider control case. The following evidence shows that the unions were not fully
controlled by the Labour Party. On February 17, 1974, Labour Party leader Harold Wilson, declared
the creation of a “social contract” with the union leadership. The following day, however, the leader
of the Trade Unions Council, denied having reached any such an agreement (Butler et al., p. 98). In
fact, Wilson was referring to the 1973 agreement between Labour and the unions which “provided
that, in return to various social policies and the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, the unions
would show voluntary restraint” (p. 55).
20See Newsweek, April 1, 1996. Also, Financial Times March 8, 1996 wrote: “Beijing Plays to
Weaken Lee’s Hand: But the Reaction Has Been De…ant.” p.33.
20the Chinese government.21
B. Electoral Victory of an Extremist and “Strong” Party.
El Salvador, 1994. In the 1994 presidential election in El Salvador, the issue
of land reform was the most polarizing and the most important. Land reform was
discussed in the peace accords between the FMLN and ARENA but at the time
of the 1994 election there was still much uncertainty as to how the issue would be
addressed (Stahler-Stolk [1995]). According to a 1994 survey, 51 percent of the rural
population had no land, and 2.9 percent of the landowners held 46 percent of the land
(Montgomery [1995]). The peasants had consistently and unequivocally favored a
comprehensive land reform policy (see Montgomery [1995] and Stahler-Stolk [1995]).
In light of this evidence, we conclude that the median voter in rural areas was a
landless or near-landless peasant who favored land reform. Nonetheless, in the 1994
election this voter preferred ARENA, a party opposed to land reform.
Given that uncertainty over the implementation of the peace accords was the decid-
ing factor in the peasants’ decision to support ARENA, voters must have perceived
violence under an ARENA government to be less likely than violence under an FMLN
government (i.e. ARENA is the strong party and there is a risk of violence if the
FMLN wins.) According to 1994 polls, a plurality of voters (31.1 percent) thought the
peace accords would be implemented if ARENA were elected and 65.6 percent of the
electorate believed that this party was backed by the military (Instituto Universitario
de Opinión Pública [1994]). Even some top FMLN o¢cials thought that a victory by
their party could endanger the country’s stability (Vickers and Spence [1994]).From
1992 to 1994, six top-ranked FMLN leaders were assassinated by right-wing militias.
In this environment, rural poor voters believed that FMLN victory would jeopardize
the peace accords and lead to a collapse of the democratic process. These concerns
about stability and order (c0 > b c0) led them to prefer ARENA, even though ARENA
would implement policies that hurt their interests regarding land reform as arises in
the model when c0 < ^ c0.
21See Wantchekon and Lam [1996] for more details.
21Our model suggests that as threats of violence become less of an issue (c0 < b c0),
ARENA should lose its decisive advantage vis-à-vis the FMLN and the political
process should become more competitive. Consistent with our analysis is the outcome
of the March 1997 congressional elections in the country. The FMLN won 32.1% of
the vote, as compared to 33.3% for ARENA. In the mayoral elections, the FMLN
more than quadrupled the number of municipalities under its control (54), including
the city of San Salvador and its suburbs where more than one-…fth of the country’s
population lives.
A competing explanation for the FMLN’s semi-victory could be a possible backlash
against “Washington consensus” policies. But this explanation would not be valid
since the country enjoyed a remarkable 4 percent growth rate from 1996 to 1997
despite or because of those policies. In other words, the fact that the ARENA lost the
1997 parliamentary and municipal elections in spite of an excellent economic record
con…rms our thesis: (1) the threat of violence was the decisive factor in ARENA’s
1994 victory and (2) after the implementation of the peace accords, as the threat
declined, a large proportion of the electorate would vote for the FMLN and against
the ARENA.
Liberia, 1997. The 1997 presidential elections in Liberia took place after 8
years of civil war that killed over 200, 000 people and destroyed most of the economic
infrastructure of the country. The two major candidates were the former World Bank
economist Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the former warlord, Charles Taylor. Throughout
the pre-electoral campaign, Taylor presented himself as the candidate who holds the
key for stability and peace. In order to signal to voters what might happen if he were
to lose the elections, he threatened the election commission with large scale violence
if the election were postponed. These threats and concerns for stability and security
became the decisive factor in the electoral outcome. According to a July 1997 survey
“voters wanted to put end to the war and to elect a strong leader who can maintain
itself in o¢ce.”(Economist, July 26, 1997). In the end, nearly 75% of the electorate
preferred Taylor over Sirleaf. Proposition 3 and the empirical evidence suggest that
22Liberians voted in such a great number for Taylor because they were convinced that
a new civil war will break out if they were to vote against him. In other words, the
outcome of the 1997 elections in Liberia was the result of a strategic move by the
electorate to put power in “strong” hands in order to secure peace and security.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes electoral incentives and outcomes when parties face threats
of political unrest. We …nd that without platform commitment, the weaker party is
moderated towards the center and wins the election. But when the risk of disruption
is privately known by the strong party, the strong party becomes more likely to
win as voter fear of disruption grows. With platform commitment and no private
information, platform convergence occurs and either party can win unless (1) the
strong party directly controls the threat and (2) the threat is serious. In that case, the
strong party always wins on the convergent policy. Finally, when the strong party has
private information, we predict platform divergence as a result of signalling. When
the threat is controlled by an outsider, this divergence is robust to arbitrarily large
direct bene…ts of o¢ce. The equilibrium strategies of parties depend on the cost of
political unrest to voters only when the threat is private information.
We have illustrated the main results of the model with the cases of the United
Kingdom, Taiwan, El Salvador and Liberia. For instance, in the 1994 Presidential
elections in El Salvador, peasants who favored land reform voted strategically for a
party opposed to this reform in order to minimize the risk of post-election violence.
In the 1974 parliamentary election in the United Kingdom, Labour took a high-wage
position, hoping that voters would believe this redistribution to be necessary to avoid
further strikes. Meanwhile, the Conservatives took a divergent position hoping that
voters would doubt the credibility of the strike threats. The recent convergence of the
Labour and Conservative Parties under Blair’s leadership coincides with a weakening
of union power in a manner not inconsistent with our model.
23APPENDIX
Notation: When the letter j denotes party s (respectively, w), ¡j will denote
party w (respectively, s). Recall that i denotes the winner of the election. We will
write sMw (respectively, sµw) to denote “the median voter (respectively, voter µ)
strictly prefers s to w.” We will write “+"” when we want to suppress the phrase,
“for su¢ciently small, positive ".”
For sections V and VI, ¼(xs;xw) is the probability that s wins the election when
s and w have committed to that pair of platforms. Xs and Xw denote the supports
for s and w’s strategies; for section VI, X1, X2 are the supports for s when s = s1,
s = s2 respectively. Recall that for the outsider control case, s = s1 implies that (s
knows that) z is militant and s = s2 implies that (s knows that) z is soft. Denote
by ´, the common posterior weight on s = s1 in the beliefs of voters and w after
observing xs.
Proof of Lemma 1
We de…ne y to be the policy implemented by the winning party, and x to be a
pre-electoral platform. We also de…ne by y the reservation policy of the outsider or
the strong party: y ´ cz ¡ 2 for the case of outsider control and, y ´ cs ¡ 2 for the
case of direct control. For the case of direct control when platform commitment is
possible, we further de…ne ¹ x ´ ¹ y + R to be the greatest platform, xs, against which
s would not create unrest against itself after winning. ¹(¢) is the measure function
on the space of voters with ¹(µ : µ 2 [¡2;2]) = 1. We will prove the lemma for the
no-commitment case. The proof for the commitment case is derived by replacing y
by x and y by x.
(i) We …rst prove that r = 0 whenever s wins. s knows ¹ y in all cases. Setting y (or
x) above ¹ y leads to r = 1 (by de…nition of ¹ y) and this gives ¡cs to s.
(a) Under outsider control, ¡cs < ¡4 (by A1
0
) and is s’s lowest possible payo¤
so any strategy containing y (or x) above ¹ y is weakly dominated by the strategy
24obtained by replacing any such policies (platforms) by y = ¡2 (x = ¡2). By as-
sumption AB, r = 0 for any strategy with all policies weakly less than ¹ y. Hence,
r = 0 when s wins by assumption AA.
(b) Under direct control, ¡cs > ¡4 (by A1) but s can always create unrest at
stage 4 so s’s payo¤ is bounded below by ¡cs, even if s loses. Replacing any policies
(platforms) that ever lead to unrest, by y = ¡2 (x = ¡2), therefore creates a weakly
dominating strategy. Hence, r = 0 for any policy in s’s strategy set by assumption
AA.
Henceforth, we only use r to refer to the probability of unrest when w wins. By part
(i), when s wins, the policy/political unrest outcome is of the form (ys;0). When
w wins the outcome is of the form (yw;r). (For the case of platform commitment,
substitute x for y.)
(ii) We can now prove that M is decisive by considering all 6 possible orderings of
ys, yw and 0. To prove that M is decisive, we prove that sMw ) ¹(µ : sµw) ¸ 1
2
and similarly wMs ) ¹(µ : wµs) ¸ 1
2.
In the case with platform commitment, the voters know that y = x; so only r needs
to be estimated and we look at deterministic policy choices. We begin with this case.
In each of the six cases (A-F), we prove that sMw ) ¹(µ : sµw) ¸ 1
2 and wMs )
¹(µ : wµs) ¸ 1




of voters. We de…ne ¢µ ´ Uµ (s) ¡ Uµ (w), ¢0 ´ U0(s) ¡ U0(w) and
¢ ´ ¢µ ¡ ¢0. It is clear that sMw , ¢0 > 0 and sµw , ¢µ > 0 so, for example,
¢ > 0 ) (sMw ) sµw).
We characterize values of ¢µ and ¢0 in cases (a-d) that will be needed in the proof:
(a) ys;yw · µ
¢µ = ys ¡µ ¡(yw ¡µ) ¢(1 ¡r) +r ¢ c
= ys ¡yw ¢ (1 ¡ r) + r ¢(c ¡µ):
(1)
ys;yw · 0
25¢0 = ys ¡yw ¢ (1 ¡ r) + r ¢ c (2)
(b) ys · µ · yw
¢µ = ys ¡µ ¡(µ ¡yw) ¢(1 ¡r) +r ¢ c (3)
ys · 0 · yw
¢0 = ys +yw ¢ (1 ¡ r) + r ¢ c (4)
(c) µ · ys;yw
¢µ = µ ¡ys ¡(µ ¡yw) ¢(1 ¡r) +r ¢ c
= ¡ys + yw (1 ¡ r)+ r(c +µ)
(5)
0 · ys;yw
¢0 = ¡ys + yw ¢(1 ¡r) +r ¢ c (6)
(d) yw · µ · ys
¢µ = µ ¡ys ¡(yw ¡µ) ¢(1 ¡r) +r ¢ c (7)
yw · 0 · ys
¢0 = ¡ys ¡ yw ¢(1 ¡r) +r ¢ c (8)
Case A: ys · yw · 0.
First, we verify that sMw ) ¹(µ : sµw) ¸ 1
2 by showing that sµw for all µ < 0
in this case. We investigate in turn the voting behavior of the three sets of voters,
µ < ys, ys · µ · yw and yw · µ · 0.
(i) It is clear that all µ · ys prefer s because by (5),
¢µ = ¡ys +yw (1 ¡r) +µ ¢ r +r ¢ c ¸ 0
26since ¡ys = jysj ¸ jyw (1 ¡r)j and c > 4 > µ. (ii) For ys · µ · yw · 0; by (3) and
(2)
¢ = 2(yw ¡µ)(1 ¡r) ¡rµ ¸ 0
as both terms are positive .
(iii) For ys · yw · µ · 0 we use (1) and (2) to compute ¢ = ¡rµ ¸ 0: Thus,
sMw ) ¹(µ : sµw) ¸ 1
2.
Second, wMs ) ¹(µ : wµs) ¸ 1
2 since all µ > 0 prefer w whenever M prefers w.
This follows from the fact that ¢ = ¡rµ by (1) and (2) and this is clearly less than
or equal to 0 for µ > 0 . Thus, M is decisive when ys · yw · 0.
Case B: ys · 0 · yw.
(i) all µ · ys prefer s since
¢µ = ¡ys +yw (1 ¡r) +µr +rc > 0
(ii) for µ 2 (ys;0), we use (3) and (4) to compute
¢ = +µ ¡ µ(1¡ r) = ¡µ(2 ¡r) > ¡rµ ¸ 0:
Therefore, sMw ) ¹(µ : sµw) ¸ 1
2.
If wMs, all voters with ideal points µ such that µ 2 [0;yw] will vote for w, since
¢ = ¡µ +rµ · 0:
In addition, all voters with ideal points µ such that µ 2 [yw;2] will also vote for w,
since by (4)
¢ = ¡2yw (1 ¡r) +rµ · 0:
Therefore, wMs ) ¹(µ : wµs) ¸ 1
2. Thus, M is decisive when ys · 0 · yw.
Case C: 0 · ys · yw.
27First, if sMw, then all voters with ideal points µ · 0 will prefer s since by (5) and
(6) ¢ = rµ ¸ 0. Second, because ys is closer to the median voter’s ideal point and
because there is no political unrest when ys is implemented, wMs can be ignored
because it cannot arise. So, M is decisive when 0 · ys · yw.
Case D: yw · ys · 0.
All µ > 0 clearly prefer s since ys is closer to their ideal point and there is no risk
of political unrest when s implements ys. This is also true for µ = 0 which means
that both sMw and sµw. wMs never arises. So, M is decisive when yw · ys · 0.
Case E: yw · 0 · ys.
All µ > ys clearly prefer s since ys is closed to their ideal points and never leads to
political unrest. For all µ 2 [0;ys], we use (7) and (8) to compute
¢ = 2µ ¡rµ ¸ 0
Thus, sMw ) sµw for all µ 2 (0;2] or ¹(µ : sµw) ¸ 1
2.
If wMs, all µ · yw prefer w since ¢µ = 2yw (1¡ r) + rµ · 0. In addition, all
µ 2 [yw;0] also prefer w since by (7), (8)
¢ = 2µ ¡rµ · ¡rµ · 0
Thus, wMs ) wµs for all µ 2 [¡2;0) or ¹(µ : wµs) ¸ 1
2. Therefore, M is decisive
when yw · 0 · ys.
Case F: 0 · yw · ys.
sMw implies sµw 8µ > 0 : First, all µ > ys clearly prefer s since ys is closer to
their ideal points and there is no risk of unrest when s implements ys. Second, all
µ 2 [yw;ys]also vote for s since by (7), (6)
¢ = (2µ ¡ 2yw)(1 ¡r) +rµ ¸ 0:
28Finally, all µ 2 [0;yw] also prefer s since by (5), (6)
¢ = rµ ¸ 0.
Conversely, if wMs, then all µ · 0 prefer w since by (5), (6)
¢ = rµ · 0:
Thus, M is decisive when 0 · yw · ys.
In the case without platform commitment, voters may now have non-trivial un-
certainty over yw but we assumed common beliefs. Furthermore, ys = ¡2 so we
only have to treat cases A and B, without the subcases A(i) and B(i). Taking the
expectation of ¢ over the remaining subcases, for µ ¸ 0 and µ · 0 in turn, veri…es
that M is decisive exactly as before. This completes the proof that M is decisive.
Proof of Proposition 1
When s wins, s chooses its ideal point, y = ¡2: w never causes unrest. When w
wins, w always seeks to avoid political unrest because cw ¸ 4. Therefore, yw · ¹ y
and since w gains by increasing yw on the range [¡2; ¹ y), the equilibrium must have
yw = ¹ y and r(y) = 0. With r(y) = 0, w prevents unrest by implementing exactly
y. All voters with µ >
y ¡2
2
prefer w. Since y = cs ¡ 2 < 2 by A1, this includes all
voters with µ ¸ 0, and hence at least 50% of the electorate so w wins. (We could have
used Lemma 1 here, but we wrote out the above proof to show that cµ is irrelevant.)
This is the unique SPE.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we show by contradiction that r(cw) is decreasing in cw: Let c0
w and cw
be two levels of the cost unrest to the weak party such that c
0
w < cw. De…ne by
r0 ´ r(c0
w) and r ´ r(cw): De…ne also by y0
w = y(c0























29because the …rst bracket is non-positive by optimality of yw given cw and the second
bracket is non-negative by optimality of y0
w given c0
w. But, after substituting and


















w < cw ; (9) implies that r0 > r . This means that r¤ is a decreasing (step)
function of cw. (r¤ is a step function since r¤ 2 f0;p;1g):
(ii) cw;~ cs (respectively, ~ cz for outsider control case) determine r, the risk of dis-
ruption when w wins the election. When s wins, r = 0. Note that r is indepen-
dent of c0: When r = 0 there is nothing to prove. When r > 0, we will now
show that re is a step function which shifts down from r to 0 at a critical level
of c0, b c0. In the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, M is decisive and chooses between
(ys;rs) = (¡2;0) and (yw;rw) = (yw;r). When s wins (i = s), M has payo¤ ¡2 and




= ¡r < 0 while u0(s) is independent of c0. Hence, M may prefer
w for low values of c0 but whenever r > 0, M prefers s for su¢ciently high values
of c0 and the shift in preference occurs at some value ^ c0 2 [2;1). This proves that
when r > 0 there exists,




i = s and re = 0;c0 > ^ c0
i = w and re = r;c0 < ^ c0
In particular, re declines as c0 rises and re = 0 as c0 ¸ ^ c0).
Proof of Proposition 4
In proving lemma 1, we showed that s never causes r > 0 so supXs · ¹ y. Similarly,
if w o¤ers a platform to the right of ¹ y, w knows that if it wins it gets its lowest
possible payo¤ of ¡cw. By deviating to platform ¹ y, it does strictly better if it ever
wins (as R > 0 and ¹ y is the best policy it can hope for) and it can do no worse (since
¡(2¡ y) ¸ ¡cw). Thus supXw · ¹ y. Using these two implications of assumption
30AA (that weakly dominated strategies are avoided), we separate the proof into two
cases.
In order to rule out uninteresting knife edge equilibria in which one party never
wins (equally ruled out by trembling hand perfection arguments), we assume that
voters mix between s and w when indi¤erent (Assumption AC)
Case ¹ y · 0 : supXs · ¹ y ) w’s best response is ¹ y because against xs < ¹ y, this
uniquely gives w its highest possible payo¤ given the threat, while against xs = ¹ y
the policy cannot be improved for w and no deviation could increase w’s chance of
winning. If w can never win we must have Xs = f¹ yg and ¼(¹ y; ¹ y) = 1 (s cannot o¤er
any policy closer to 0 than ¹ y either) but this contradicts assumption AC. Since w
can win, Xw = f¹ yg. The only best response for s in turn is also ¹ y unless ¼(¹ y; ¹ y) = 0
in which case s is willing to o¤er any platform. We designed AC to ensure that
¼(¹ y; ¹ y) 6= 0. Using AC, we have a unique best responses of ¹ y so that there is a
unique equilibrium with convergence of platforms at ¹ y. Without using AC, there
would simply be an additional range of equilibria in which only w wins and s adopts
any strategy it likes or only s wins and w randomizes over strategies (which must
have signi…cant weight on ¹ y). In these equilibria, the winner always o¤ers ¹ y so the
policy outcome is still at the “convergence point,” ¹ y.
Case ¹ y > 0 : Given that all strategies use only platforms x · ¹ y, the problem reduces
to platform competition on the restricted policy space, [¡2; ¹ y] and where the extra
dimension created by the risk of unrest can be neglected since no party ever o¤ers a
platform with r > 0. The median voter’s ideal point, 0, lies strictly inside this range
and we can apply the well known median convergence theorem - see Roemer [1994]
for a proof which treats a case in which parties are ideological but also value winning
the election for its own sake and therefore encompasses our model.
Proof of Proposition 5
We assume that s always knows ¹ y and so, exactly as in the proof of proposition
4, undominatedness (assumption AA) requires that supX1 · a and supX2 · b;
31meanwhile, w only knows that ¹ y · b, so we can only know that, supXw · b: any
platform above b guarantees w its lowest payo¤ when it wins and is weakly dominated
by o¤ering b which gives w the highest payo¤ it can hope for when it wins. Thus
assumption AA gives supXw · b and supX1 · a while supX2 · b. We now derive
further restrictions on equilibrium form.
1. Suppose s pools on a single platform, x. Then x · a else s1 will never choose
x. Furthermore, ´(x) = p since voters learn nothing. We now consider what w’s
responses can give: (i) if xw = b then w wins because p < ^ p by A4 implies that,
p(¡c0)+ (1¡ p)b > ¡^ p ¢ c0 +(1 ¡ ^ p)b = b ¡(b ¡a) = a ¸ x
and so w gets a payo¤ of Uw ´ ¡p ¢ cw + (1 ¡p)(b ¡2 + R); (ii) if xw < x then
s wins (r = 0 either way) and so w gets a payo¤ of u0
w ´ x ¡ 2 · a ¡ 2. Now











^ p ¡ 1, A5 guarantees that







w ¸ (1 ¡p)(b¡ a +R) ¡ p(cw +a ¡ 2)
> (1 ¡ ^ p)(b¡ a +R) ¡ ^ p
µ








= b ¡a ¡ ^ p(b+ c0) = 0
(iii) For x < a, xw 2 [x;a) is dominated by xw = a as R+a¡2 > x¡2 (when x = a,
[x;a) is empty); (iv) For xw 2 (a;b), w gets a convex combination of Uw ¡ (b¡ xw)
and U0
w both of which are worse than Uw so that would be a dominated response.
It follows that w’s best response is restricted to xw 2 fa;bg. Now if xw = a with
probability 1 then, either ¼ (x;a) < 1 in which case s2 would deviate to a + " or
¼(x;a) = 1 but then w would deviate to b to get uw which is greater than a ¡2. So
we must have b 2 Xw.
Suppose that xw = b with probability 1 and ¼(b;b) > 0. Then s2 would deviate to
b to increase its payo¤ by ¼(b;b)R. There is a set of equilibria in which Xw = fbg,
Xs = fxg (with x · a) and ¼(b;b) = 0. In these equilibria, w always wins but the
platforms must exhibit divergence of at least b¡ a so we store this result.
322. Now we must study non-singleton strategies for s. We begin with a corollary of
the above: w cannot always lose: an equilibrium in which w always loses would have
to have pure pooling (if X1 [X2 contained more than one platform we can derive a
contradiction because both types of s would strictly prefer o¤ering, and winning on,
the more extreme of any two such platforms) but the above argument proved that w
must always win in any pure pooling equilibrium.
3. We can show that w’s best response lies in fa;bg in any PBE. We de…ne X?
w
to be the set of xw 2 Xw for which w wins with strictly positive probability in the
hypothesized PBE. We know that X?
w 6= ;, the null set, because w cannot always
lose.
For xw 2 X?
w \[¡2;a), we want to consider a deviation to xw = a. We have to
consider the consequences of the deviation for all possible xs 2 Xs (of course, some
of the cases may not arise) and integrate using the weights in s’s strategy to compare
the expected return to xw with that from the deviation: (i) Against xs > a, w loses
both at xw and at the suggested deviation (s’s platform will be closer to 0 given that
xs · b and s wins because s never causes unrest by Lemma 1(i)). (ii) Against those
xs < a to which w was losing at xw, w will win by deviating because r = 0 when
xw = a and jaj < jxsj, this gives a “bene…t gain” of R and a “policy gain” of a ¡xs.
(iii) Against those xs < a at which w was winning at xw, w still wins and has a policy
gain of a ¡ xs. (iv) Against xs = a, w would have been losing and a deviation to a
implies no policy change and possibly some bene…t gain. Now by the de…nition of
X?
w, we know that w must have been winning sometimes so the expectation places
positive weight on case (iii) where xw = a brings a strict improvement and since this
deviation causes no losses in the other cases, it is strictly optimal for w to deviate.
This contradiction proves that X?
w \ [¡2;a) = ;.
With a little more di¢culty, we can also prove that X?
w \ (a;b) = ;. Take xw 2
X?
w \ (a;b) and consider the deviation to xw = b. (i) Against xs 2 (a;b), ´ = 0 and
w wins at b with a policy gain of b¡ xs (and bene…t gain of R if w was losing). (ii)
Against xs = b, w was losing and may now win R with no policy change. (iii) Against
33those xs · a to which w was losing, either w continues to lose or w now wins at b
and the key question is whether w wants to start winning. To answer this, note that
w only starts winning if ´(xs) = ´ satis…es




Using assumption A5 to substitute for cw,
































(¡b ¡2) +(c0 ¡2)
b +c0
¢ R = 0
from which we see that w only starts to win when w is strictly better o¤ by winning.
(iv) Against those xs · a at which w was winning, w makes a policy gain of b ¡ xs.
Again, we have that the deviation never hurts and because case (iii) cannot be the
only case, we know that w strictly gains from the deviation. This contradiction proves
that X?
w \ (a;b) = ;.
4. Combining the results, we have ; 6= X?
w µ fa;bg. Now if b 2 X?
w, w is strictly
better o¤ at b than at any platform at which w is sure to lose (b 2 X?
w, 9 xs :
xs < ´(¡c0) + (1 ¡´)b and part (iii) of the last argument proved that w strictly
bene…ts from winning here for all xs against which it wins). Meanwhile, if a 2 X?
w,
w is strictly better o¤ at a than at any platform at which w always loses because,
for all xs at which w wins, xs < ´(¡c0)+(1 ¡´)a and from this we can use the fact
that,






to repeat the argument of case (iii) above, substituting a for b throughout. This
proves that Xw = X?
w µ fa;bg.
345. Suppose that w mixes with probability weight q on a and 1 ¡ q on b, for some
q 2 [0;1]
(i) If q = 0 then we have divergence of at least b ¡ a a fraction at least p of the
time because xs · a whenever s = s1. Next, we de…ne ¹ q ´ R+b+2
2R+b+2 which lies strictly
between 0 and 1 for any R > 0. If 0 < q · ¹ q, then 1 ¡ q ¸ R
2R+b+2 and we have
divergence of at least b ¡ a a fraction at least R
2R+b+2 ¢p of the time. If q > ¹ q, we
must treat two cases.
(ii) If q > ¹ q and ¼(a;a) = 1 then we must have some s sometimes o¤er a platform
with x < a else w would always be losing at a, contradicting the result in point 4
above. But either type of s can get a payo¤ bounded below by,
q(¡2 ¡a + R)+ (1¡ q)(¡2 ¡b) (10)
by adopting platform a. While an upper bound to the payo¤ available from a platform
to the left of a is,
q(¡2 ¡ a)+ (1¡ q)(¡2 +2 + R) (11)
and this is strictly lower than the lower bound given q > ¹ q:
q >
R +b +2
2R + b+ 2
) q ¢ R +(1 ¡q)(¡b¡ 2¡ R) > 0
(iii) If q > ¹ q and ¼(a;a) < 1 then s2 has no best response22 unless it is b: s2’s
best response cannot lie in (a;b) because ´(x) = 0 for all x in this range and w only
o¤ers a or b so moving closer to a would always increase s2’s payo¤; furthermore,
s2’s best response cannot lie in [¡2;a) because s2 would lose to w when w o¤ers a as
above and deviating to a +" for su¢ciently small " arbitrarily closely approximates
the same lower bound payo¤ as in (11) above, so we have the same result. Finally,
s2’s best response cannot equal a because s2 does strictly better (a gain within "of
22If the policy space is discrete, s2 could have a best response just to the right of a (at “a
+”)
and s1 could be setting a platform of a but in this case w o¤ers b because w then wins against s2
and not against s1, implying that w gains b ¡ a
+ with probability 1 ¡ p and R with probability
1 ¡ p ¡ p ¢ ¼ (a;a) which is unambiguously positive if p · 1
2.
35R ¢ ¼(a;a)) by deviating to a + ". Hence, s2’s best response is b as claimed. So we
have divergence of at least b¡ a with probability at least (1 ¡ q)p +q(1¡ p) of the
time (note that (1 ¡ q)p +q(1 ¡ p) ¸ min(p;1 ¡p), for all q).






of the time. In conclusion, we have a strictly positive
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37Figure I:
Equilibrium Probability of Unrest as a Function of cw.
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^ 4 cw cwTABLE I:
Summary of the Main Results.
Complete Information Private Information
No Commitment
² the weak party wins the election:
² the weak party implements a
“moderate” and “safe” policy, y:
² there is no political unrest
² when c0 is “moderate”, the weak
party wins, implements a “moderate”
policy and there is a risk of unrest.
² when c0 is “high”, the strong party
wins, implements an “extremist”
policy and there is no unrest.
Commitment
² both parties choose the same
platform.
² the strong party wins if it
directly controls the source of
the threat.
² there is no political unrest.
² when cw and p are “moderate”, the
strong party and the weak party
choose di¤erent platforms, either
party wins and there is a risk
of unrest.
² when either cw or p is “high”, both
parties choose the same platform,
the strong party wins and there
is no unrest.
Note: (1) y is the reservation policy of the strong party, that is, the minimal policy
compromise that weak party must make to prevent political unrest, (2) c0 is the cost
of unrest to the median voter, (3) cw is the cost of unrest to the weak party, (4) p is
the probability that the strong party is “very” strong.